a research overview.
My research interests include judicial politics, quantitative methods, administrative law, civil procedure, and American political institutions. Many of my current projects focus on lower federal court judicial decision making. My disseration, supported by an NSF Dissertation Improvement Grant, is entitled Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy. I am also interested in bringing unique and interesting methods and data to the study of other legal institutions and actors.
While in graduate school, I participated in a number of major data collection projects beyond my dissertation. In the summer of 2005, under an NSF grant held by Professors Lee Epstein and Harold Spaeth, I assisted in the collection of the Blackmun Certiorari papers at the Library of Congress. From 2007-2009, I served as the project manager for the EEOC Litigation Analysis Project, an NSF funded project spearheaded by Professors Pauline Kim, Margo Schlanger, and Andrew D. Martin that examines EEOC litigation in the federal district courts.
data.
Federal District Court Judge Ideology Scores (details and data here)publications.
Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin. 2010 "Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging." American Journal of Political Science (accepted for publication)Winner of the 2008 Midwest Political Science Association Pi Sigma Alpha Award
Christina L. Boyd and David A. Hoffman. 2010. "Disputing Limited Liability" Northwestern University Law Review Forthcoming. Vol. 104(3).
Using a newly collected set of data, we examine veil piercing lawsuits brought in the federal district courts over six years. We find that plaintiffs succeed quite often in veil piercing litigation, if success is defined as winning on motions that do not terminate a case. A variety of legal and extra-legal factors predict such interstitial veil piercing success. Voluntary creditor causes of action promote veil piercing; LLCs are in very limited circumstances better insulated from veil piercing claims than corporations; undercapitalization is strongly associated with success while conclusory grounds like "facade" and "sham" are not; and defendants' legal sophistication is predictive of plaintiff failure. Extra-legal factors play a more striking and counterintuitive role. Plaintiffs suing small companies are much more likely to win veil piercing motions and obtain case-level relief than those suing larger companies.
Our findings call into question existing approaches to the disputation of limited liability and contribute to more general scholarship about selection effects and judicial behavior. They do not provide any easy answers to the questions of what defendants can do to insulate themselves from veil piercing. Our analysis suggests: very little, apart from being very big.
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, and Christina L. Boyd. 2007. "On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II." Vanderbilt Law Review 60:101-146
Christina L. Boyd and James F. Spriggs. 2009. “An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges” Washington University Journal of Law and Policy. 29: 37-80.
Pauline Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd, and Andrew D. Martin. 2009. “Studying District Court Decision Making” Washington University Journal of Law and Policy. 29: 83-112.
Christina L. Boyd and Lee Epstein. May 3, 2009. “When Women Rule, It Makes a Difference” Washington Post.
Also published in Chapel Hill Herald, May 3, 2009; The China Post, May 4, 2009; Dallas
Morning News, May 4, 2009; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 5, 2009; Miami Herald, May 5,
2009; Virginian-Pilot, May 5, 2009; May 10, 2009; San Mateo County Times, May 10, 2009;
Contra Costa Times, May 10, 2009; Alameda Times-Star, May 10, 2009; Oakland Tribute,
May 10, 2009.
Lee Epstein, Christina L. Boyd and Andrew D. Martin. 2008. "The Court(s) and the Election" Miller-McCune Magazine.
This article is available here.
dissertation.
(1) Integrating Process, Policy, and Outcomes in Judicial Studies
2004, I assess the impact that courts of appeals have on district court decision making after a
case is appealed to the circuit court and then returned to the district court on remand. I find
that appellate courts do impact district courts, both in terms of the parties that win and the
disposition methods that take place. Specifically, the specificity of appellate court directions
given to district courts are an important determinant of impact, as is the appellate court
decision to publish the opinion remanding the case to the district court. These findings
have vast implications, including for hierarchical control in the judiciary, appellate court
bargaining, and perceptions of judicial legitimacy. A draft of this essay is available here (.pdf).
(2) The Impact of Courts of Appeals on Substantive and Procedural Success in the Federal District Courts
(3) Quantifying Appeals
hold the key to shaping the institutional agenda. As theory explains, the choice to mobilize
one’s case for appeal can be explained by strategic, political, and procedural reasons. After
detailing these theories, I turn to an empirical exploration of them in the judicial system.
Using a newly collected dataset of federal district court civil cases decided between 2000 and
2004, the results are rather revealing, indicating that strategy and procedural fairness are
both important considerations in the decision of a litigant to appeal.
other ongoing projects.
She'll Settle It: Judges, Their Sex, and the Disposition of Cases in Federal District Courts
Advisor Influence on Political Elites: Law Clerks and the U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda Setting Process (with Ryan C. Black) [under review]
U.S. Supreme Court Agenda Setting and the Role of Litigant Status (with Ryan C. Black) [under review]